



COMMENCLEMEN OF SECTION 1 OF HIE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
AMENDMENT ACT 65 OF 2008
This Act came into operation in respect of the magisterial
district of Pietermaritzburg on 15 February 2011, and for the
magisterial district of Highveld Ridge on 31 October 2011. It
provides for the postponement of certain criminal proceedings
against an accused person in custody awaiting trial to be
conducted through audiovisual link (s 159A). This provision is
applicable to accused persons over the age of 18 years, who are
in custody in a correctional facility in respect of an offence, who
have already appeared in court, and whose case has been
postponed (in other words, accused persons in custody pending
the trial), and are required to appear, or to be brought, before a
court in subsequent proceedings. Such accused persons may,
for the purpose of a further postponement of the case or
consideration of release on bail in terms of sections 60, 63, 63A,
307, 308A or 321, where the granting of bail is not opposed by
the prosecutor, or where the granting of bail does not require the
leading of evidence, appear before the court by means of
audiovisual link. The proceedings will be regarded as having
been held in the presence of the accused person if the accused
is held in custody in a correctional facility and is able to follow
the court proceedings and the court is able to see and hear the
accused person by means of audiovisual link. Thus, in terms of
section 159A, it will be deemed that an accused person appear-
ing by means of audiovisual link had appeared before a court for
all intents and purposes. A court can, however, direct that section
159A should not apply and that the accused should rather
appear physically before court. The requirements for audiovisual
appearance by an accused person and the technical require-
ments are set out in sections 159B and 159C respectively (for a
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recent decision on section 159 of the Criminal Procedure Act 51
of 1977, see S v Dlomo 2011 JDR 0466 (GNP)).
The 2008 Amendment Act also makes provision for the falling
away of certain convictions as previous convictions after the
expiry of a fixed period (s 271A), and it provides for the expunge-
ment of criminal records of certain persons in respect of whom
certain sentences have been imposed after the compliance with
certain requirements and the expiry of the fixed period (s 271 B).
The expungement of criminal records of persons in terms
of legislation enacted before the Constitution of the Republic of
South Africa took effect, is also provided for in s 271 C.
JUDGFs' RFMUNERATION AND CONDITIONS OF EMPLOYMFNT
AMLNDMENTi BILL B12-2011
The Judges' Remuneration and Conditions of Employment
Amendment Bill B12-2011 amends the Act by providing for a
minimum period of active service as Chief Justice of South Africa
and as President of the Supreme Court of Appeal. Provision is
made in section 8(a) of the Bill for the Chief Justice of South Africa
to perform active service as the Chief Justice for a minimum of
seven years, or until he/she attains the age of 75 years, whichever
event occurs first. In section 8(b) provision is made for the
President of the Supreme Court of Appeal to perform active
service as the President of the Supreme Court of Appeal for a
minimum period of seven years, or until he/she attains the age of
75 years, whichever event occurs first.
CONSrrU IHON SLVENLENTIl AMENDMENI BILL B6-2011 AND
SUPERIOR COURTS BiLL B7-2011
The Constitution Seventeenth Amendment Bill B6-2011 prima-
rily deals with and amends the court structure of South Africa and
the role of different role players in the judiciary. Some of the most
important amendments include section 165 of the Constitution of
the Republic of South Africa, 1996, which is to be amended to
provide that the Chief Justice is the head of the judiciary and that
the Chief Justice will exercise responsibility over the establish-
ment and monitoring of norms and standards for the exercise of
the judicial functions of all courts. The aim of this amendment is to
provide for an integrated system of court governance within a
single judiciary.
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The various high courts in South Africa are, in terms of sections
166, 169, 172 and 173 to be converted into a single High Court of
South Africa comprising Divisions, seats and jurisdictions as
determined by the Superior Courts Bill B7-2011. Each province
in South Africa will have at least a Division of the High Court.
All references to magistrates' courts are furthermore to be
removed and substituted by a reference to lower courts. Section
167 of the Constitution is to be amended to establish the Constitu-
tional Court as the apex court with jurisdiction in all constitutional
matters and any other matter in which it may grant leave to appeal.
The Constitutional Court will consequently be the highest court for
all matters, constitutional as well as non-constitutional, with the
Supreme Court of Appeal as an intermediate court of appeal.
CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDIUCT
The Judicial Service Commission Amendment Act 20 of 2008
was assented to on 22 October 2008 and provides for a Code
of Judicial Conduct to serve as the prevailing standard of all
judicial conduct. The Code provides for the establishment and
maintenance of a register of judges' registrable financial inter-
ests, the procedures to deal with the complaints about judges,
the establishment of judicial conduct tribunals to enquire into and
report on the alleged incapacity, gross misconduct or gross
incompetence of judges and the procedures for matters inciden-
tal thereto. On 19 January 2011, interested parties submitted
proposals at a public hearing on the draft Code of Judicial
Conduct.
DR\Fr DAG\EROUS NWLPONS BiLL, 2011
Following the decision of the Constitutional Court in S v Thunzi
2011 (3) BCLR 281 (CC), the draft Dangerous Weapons Bill, 2011
was published for public comment in Notice 606 of 2011 in
Government Gazette 34579. The bill purports to repeal and
substitute the Dangerous Weapons Act in operation in the areas
of the erstwhile Republics of South Africa, Transkei, Bophutha-
tswana, Venda and Ciskei, and to provide for matters connected
therewith.
ACCREDIED DIVERSION PROGRAMMFS AND SERVICE PROVIDERS IN
IRMS OF TH1E CHILD JUSTCLE ACT 75 OF 2008
In Government Gazette 34659 of 5 October 2011, the Minister
of Social Development published the particulars of the recog-
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nized diversion programmes and diversion service providers in
terms of section 56(3)(a) of the Child Justice Act 75 of 2008.
CASE LAW
PRIVAI PROSLCU IJONs, APPLICATION FOR PLvA NENTY Si TY OF
PROSECUTION, AND EXINTION OF SECURITY OF TENURE ACT 62 OF
1997
In Crookes v Sibisi and Others 2011 (1) SACR 23 (KZP), the
respondents instituted a private prosecution against the appel-
lant on charges of contravening s 23(1) of the Extension of
Security of Tenure Act 62 of 1997 (ESTA). (The Director of Public
Prosecutions had indicated in April of 2003 that the National
Prosecution Authority would not continue with a prosecution as
there were no reasonable chances of success.) Throughout the
period of 2002 to 2007, discussions between the legal represen-
tatives of the private prosecutors and the appellant took place
in an attempt to achieve a resolution to the dispute between
the parties, but without success. The appellant now applied for
a permanent stay of prosecution, contending that his right to a
speedy trial (s 35(3) of the Constitution) had been violated, as
various summons had been issued against him over the past five
years only to be withdrawn, that the threat of prosecution was
only an attempt by the respondents to obtain money from him,
and that this constituted an abuse of process. He also submitted
that the passage of time had resulted in inevitable prejudice
against him since witnesses and documents were no longer
available and that a private prosecutor was entitled to institute a
private prosecution only once and must then pursue or abandon
it.
The respondents submitted, however, that the apparent delay
in this case was less than two years, and part of this was
undoubtedly occasioned by the appellant and his legal represen-
tatives.
In this matter it was emphasized that a court will only reach a
conclusion that there was an undue delay in prosecution and that
it violated a party's right to a speedy trial in extreme cases and
in this instance no extreme circumstances existed (para [8]).
The appellant's argument, that court documents had been lost,
specifically the court order for the respondents' eviction from the
farm, was also not accepted. It was held that the onus of proving
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that the evictions were unlawful rested upon the private prosecu-
tors and that it was for them to prove that no such court order was
obtained (para [9]).
Finally, with regard to the contention that a private prosecutor
may only institute a private prosecution once and must then
pursue or abandon it, the court considered the relevant provi-
sions of the Criminal Procedure Act. In terms of section 12, a
private prosecution must proceed in the same manner as if it
were a prosecution at the instance of the State, subject to the
provisions of the Criminal Procedure Act and, in this instance,
section 23(5) of the ESTA. First, section 7(2)(c) of the Criminal
Procedure Act provides that a private prosecution must proceed
expeditiously, as the certificate (issued in terms of s 7(1) by the
National Prosecuting Authority) will lapse after three months of
the date of the certificate. In this case, however, the private
prosecution was brought in terms of section 23(5) of the ESTA. In
terms of this provision, the private prosecutor must give notice to
the public prosecutor in whose jurisdiction the intended prosecu-
tion will take place and the public prosecutor must respond within
fourteen days of receipt of such notice, stating in writing whether
he/she intends to prosecute or not (para [14]).
With regard to prosecutions by the National Prosecuting
Authority, section 6(a) of the ESTA provides expressly for the
power to withdraw a charge before an accused is called upon to
plead. In such situations an accused is not entitled to a verdict or
acquittal in respect of that charge. No similar provisions exist for
private prosecutions, however. And in terms of section 11 of the
Criminal Procedure Act, a charge against an accused shall be
dismissed, if the private prosecutor does not appear on the day
set down for the appearance of the accused, unless the court has
reason to believe that the private prosecutor was prevented from
being present by circumstances beyond his/her control. After
such a dismissal no further private prosecution may be pursued
in respect of that charge.
In this matter, it was found that whilst a private prosecutor must
bring a private prosecution within three months after having
obtained a certificate nolle prosequi, a considerable period of
time may lapse between the events giving rise to the private
prosecution and the person concerned seeking a nolle prosequi
from the Director of Public Prosecutions. The court held that once
this is recognized, the appellant's reliance on section 7(2) of the
Criminal Procedure Act provides no support for his argument
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(para [19]). And, as in any other prosecution, the private prosecu-
tor is dominus litus and has the right to withdraw charges if he
or she so wishes (para [ 22]). The court concluded that it often
happens that parties reach a resolution (or attempt to do so) and
that a prosecution is withdrawn while they negotiate. This does
not bar a private prosecutor from reinstituting a prosecution if
such negotiations had failed (para [24]).
See also S v Naude 2011 JDR 0839 (GNP).
Does taking advice from legal counsel influence the voluntariness of an
accused's plea?
The legal representatives of the applicant in Pretorius v Direc-
tor of Public Prosecutions and Another 2011 (1) SACR 54 (KZP)
advised the applicant, who stood arraigned on one count of theft,
two counts of fraud, six counts relating to the contravention of a
number of sections of the Natal Nature Conservation Ordinance
15 of 1974, and four counts relating to the contravention of the
regulations promulgated in terms of that ordinance, to plead
guilty to some of these charges. They also advised him that if he
(the applicant) did not accept their advice and plead guilty to a
number of the charges, the applicant would have to appoint new
counsel as they would not be able to assist any further. The
prosecutor, in turn, agreed that the remainder of the charges
would then be dropped. The applicant accepted this advice and
was consequently convicted and sentenced to various terms of
imprisonment all of which were suspended on certain conditions.
The applicant, however, wanted this conviction and sentence to
be set aside arguing that he (the applicant) wanted to plead not
guilty to all counts, but the undue pressure by his legal represen-
tatives caused him to change his mind and plead guilty to six of
the counts. The applicant submitted that he did not act freely and
voluntarily when he pleaded guilty (para [8]).
It is trite that the party who wishes to set aside a criminal
conviction and sentence on review on the ground of irregularity
must, on a balance of probabilities, prove such an irregularity (para
[24]). In this matter, it was evident that the applicant's legal counsel
had properly and competently advised and counselled him about
his options before his plea (para [29]). And, the applicant could
have appointed new counsel if he did not agree with the legal
advice he received. Also, after pleading guilty, the prosecutor
questioned the applicant and his legal counsel and it did not
transpire during the questioning that there was any misunderstand-




In Minister of Safety and Security and Another v Mhlana 2011
(1) SACR 63 (WCC), the respondent, an attorney in the employ of
the State Attorney, Cape Town, was arrested for riotous behaviour
and assault after an altercation with a traffic officer. He was
detained for four hours and thereafter charged with assault. After
the respondent had made written representations for the pros-
ecution against him not to proceed, the charge of assault was
withdrawn by the office of the Director of Public Prosecutions. The
respondent thereafter sued the appellants for R100 000 for
unlawful arrest and detention, as well as malicious prosecution.
However, when relying upon section 40(1)(a) of the Criminal
Procedure Act, it is not necessary that the crime (in this instance
riotous behaviour) be committed, or that the arrestee be later
charged and convicted of the suspected offence. The magistrate
of the court below was consequently at fault for describing
the arrest as unlawful because the respondent's behaviour did
not comply with all the requirements for a charge of riotous
behaviour. The officers on the scene observed behaviour that
was prima facie criminal, and the fact that the respondent's
conduct might not have resulted in a charge of riotous behaviour
does not in any way detract from this (para [15]).
In Aruforse v Minister of Home Affairs and Others 2011 (1)
SACR 69 (GSJ), the applicant, a Burundian national, sought his
immediate release from a facility operated by the third respon-
dent for the Department of Home Affairs, where illegal foreigners
were detained pending their deportation from the Republic of
South Africa. The applicant was arrested as an illegal foreigner on
15 July 2009 and was being detained pending his deportation.
From 15 July 2009 to 12 August 2009, the applicant was detained
without a warrant in terms of s 34(1) of the Immigration Act 13 of
2002. Section 34(1) of the Immigration Act permits an initial
period of detention without a warrant not exceeding 30 calendar
days. This period may be reduced if the foreigner requests that
his or her detention be confirmed by a magistrate's warrant and if
such a warrant is not obtained within 48 hours, the foreigner must
be released immediately. However, the initial period of detention
can only be extended by a magistrate's court for a period not
exceeding 90 calendar days and does not permit a further
extension once a magistrate has extended the initial period of
detention. On 12 August 2009, the magistrates' court, in terms
of section 34(1)(d), extended the applicant's detention for a
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period of 90 calendar days. This period expired during Novem-
ber 2009 and was not extended again (para [11]). The 66
applicants in this matter were therefore being detained unlaw-
fully.
In Coetzee v National Commissioner of Police and Others 2011
(1) SACR 132 (GNP), the applicant was not released on police
bail, which was normal for the alleged transgressions of which the
applicant was suspected. Reynolds and Another v Minister of
Safety and Security 2011 (1) SACR 594 (WCC) concerned a
dispute about an arrest and subsequent detention in terms of the
Domestic Violence Act 116 of 1998. In S v Mjali 2011 JDR 0950
GSJ), the accused's right to liberty and the postponement of a
bail application was considered.
See also Prinsloo v Nasionale Vervolgingsgesag en Andere
2011 (1) SACR 196 (GNP); Minister of Safety and Security v
Sekhoto and Another 2011 (1) SACR 315 (SCA); S v Lekgau 2011
JDR 0002 (GN P); and Beka v The Minister of Safety and Security
2011 JDR 0751 (GNP).
CoURT's DU Ty To GIvL RLX kSONS At iiL END OF TRIAL, AND
PROMOTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICF ACT 3 OF 2000
In an automatic review in terms of section 302(1) of the Criminal
Procedure Act, it transpired that the trial judge gave no reasons
for the convictions and sentences at the end of the respective
trials (S v Molawa: S v Mpengesi 2011 (1) SACR 350 (GSJ)).
Section 93ter(3) of the Magistrates' Courts Act provides that it
shall be incumbent on a court to give reasons for its decision or
finding on any matter where a magistrate sits with assessors and
there is a difference of opinion upon any question of fact, or for
the decision or finding of the member of the court who is in the
minority or, where the presiding judge sits with only one assessor.
Also, the word 'judgment' in terms of section 1 of the Act is said to
comprise both the reasons for the judgment and the judgment
order. The review court in this matter also held that all important
findings of fact should be contained in the judgment at the
conclusion of the trial and the same should apply in the magis-
trates' courts in terms of section 93ter(3)(e) of the Act (para [13]).
Reasons for a judgment are furthermore important, as the right
to appeal and review is constitutionally entrenched for every
accused person in s 35(3)(o) of the Constitution. The task of an
appeal or review court is consequently much easier if a compre-
hensive judgment with reasons exists (para [15]). Where a trial
77
ANNUALSURVEY OFSA LAW
court does not furnish reasons for its findings in the form of a
reasoned judgment, the reviewing judge would be disadvan-
taged in applying the test as to whether the proceedings were in
accordance with justice (para [16]).
Moshidi J described the importance of giving reasons for
judgments in terms of the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act
3 of 2000 (PAJA), saying that although courts and judicial officers
are not organs of State, and their functions and decisions are not
administrative action, the meritorious rationale for furnishing
reasons for administrative action by organs of State seems highly
attractive in this instance (para [ 20]). It was held that to adopt the
rationale for furnishing reasons as prescribed for administrative
action under the PAJA would benefit the criminal justice system
and achieve the ideals of a fair trial, as envisaged in section 35(3)
of the Constitution (para [20]).
RELEASE OF ACCUSED ON BAIL WIHCH DOES NOT INCLiUDE PAYMENT
OF SiM OF MONLY
The appellant in S v Jacobs 2011 (1) SACR 490 (ECP) was
awaiting trial on a charge of assaulting his four-month-old child
with a hammer. At his first appearance in court, he indicated that
he wanted to apply for legal aid and the case was postponed for
this purpose. The appellant was granted bail of R800. The bail
remained unpaid however and an application was made for the
appellant to be released in accordance with the provisions of
section 60(2B)(b)(i) of the Criminal Procedure Act. This applica-
tion was refused and the appellant appealed against the refusal
of the magistrate to release him on conditions which did not
include payment of a sum of money as envisaged in section
60(2B)(b)(i).
From the fact that the appellant was granted bail at his first
appearance, it was inferred that the trial court was satisfied that
the interests of justice permitted the release of the appellant on
bail. No enquiry was made, however, as to whether the appellant
could afford the bail amount (para [6]). And with each of the
appellants attempts to be released on bail in terms of section
60(2B)(b)(i), the magistrate commented that it could not have
been the intention of the legislature that, on finding that an
accused could not afford to pay bail, the accused could simply
be released on conditions which did not include payment of a
sum of money. Such practice, it was submitted, would not allow
the court the opportunity to consider other factors like the
378
CR MINAL PROCEDURE
seriousness of the offence, for example. The magistrate further-
more held that section 60(2B)(b)(i) does not remove a court's
discretion to consider factors such as the factors that are
considered in formal bail applications. The magistrate indicated
that if a contrary interpretation of the relevant section was
accepted, it would lead to the situation where courts would have
to release the accused on a warning with conditions, or remand
the accused in custody without bail being set, if the accused
does not have money to pay the bail amount (para [8]). Yet, the
appellant argued that once it had been found that the interests of
justice permitted the release of an accused on bail consider-
ations such as the seriousness of the offence did not apply when
considering the bail amount. Those considerations, it was said,
belonged to the first enquiry, whether or not the interests of justice
permitted the release of the accused on bail (para [9]).
Roberson AJ held that it has long been recognized that bail
should be set in an amount which is affordable, as it would
otherwise effectively result in a refusal of bail. The means of an
accused should therefore be considered when deciding on a bail
amount and other factors may also be taken into consideration.
Section 60(2B)(b)(i) does not preclude the consideration of other
factors when deciding on appropriate conditions for bail to be
set. The courts retain a discretion and should accordingly
consider all other conditions and considerations before deciding
on an appropriate bail amount (para [10]).
In this matter, it was held that the magistrate over-emphasized
the seriousness of the offence and did not have regard to the
other factors relevant to the bail application.
DUILS OF POLICE IN TERMS OF DOMLTIC VIOLENCE ACT 116 OF
1998
In Minister of Safety and Security v Venter and Others 2011 (2)
SACR 67 (SCA), the appellants appealed against the North
Gauteng High Court judgment holding the Minister of Safety and
Security liable for damages suffered by the respondents because
of the negligent failure by members of the South African Police
Service to perform their statutory duties under the Domestic
Violence Act 116 of 1998. In terms of this Act, the police have a
legal duty to assist complainants to protect themselves in terms
of the Act, and to also take active steps to protect complainants.
The first and second respondent in this case had approached
their local police station to enquire about obtaining an interdict
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to prevent the second respondent's ex-husband from entering
their property. They did not pursue this, however. Later, as the
behaviour of the second respondent's ex-husband became more
threatening, they made a statement at the police station to this
effect, but said that they did not want the police to conduct an
investigation. They only wanted the police to prevent the second
respondent's ex-husband from entering the property. As the
behaviour of the second respondent's ex-husband continued
unabated, the second respondent again made a statement at
the local police station and this time asked that the matter be
investigated. Yet nothing was done and the second respondent's
husband eventually went to the respondents' house and raped
the second respondent and shot and injured the first respondent.
The appellants argued, however, that the respondents had failed
to prove that their (the appellants') negligence had caused
damages, because the respondents themselves were negligent
in not obtaining an interdict and taking more active steps to
protect themselves. It was submitted that the respondents would
probably not have taken steps to protect themselves, even if the
police had assisted them, or, at the very least, that their own
negligence contributed to what had happened.
Section 2 of the Domestic Violence Act 116 of 1998 (as well as
the National Instructions on Domestic Violence issued by the
National Commissioner of the SAPS and published in GG 20778
of 30 December 1999) imposes a duty on police officers to assist
and inform complainants of their rights under the Act (para [19]).
On receipt of a domestic violence complaint, wide-ranging duties
are imposed on both the station commander and the police
officer receiving the complaint. These include that the complaint
must be investigated, general assistance must be provided to the
parties involved, and specific assistance must be provided
where necessary. The complaint must be recorded in the occur-
rence book as well as the member's pocketbook, and a notice
must be handed to the complainant in the language of his/her
choice, detail ing a complainant's right to lay a charge, or to apply
for a protection order, or to do both. The difference between the
various remedies must furthermore also be explained to a
complainant (para [24]). In this matter, however, the respondents
were contributory negligent in failing to obtain the interdict, and
this contributed to their harm (para [33]).
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PAYING ADMIssioN OF GUILT FINE IN TERMS OF WRITTEN NOTICE TO
APPEA R
The accused in S v Fynn 2011 (2) SACR 178 (KZP) paid an
admission of guilt fine in the sum of R100 in respect of an assault
common charge preferred against him in terms of a written notice
to appear. The conviction and fine were confirmed by a magis-
trate on 17 September 2009. On 28 September 2009, however,
the accused wrote to the district magistrate to have the case
reopened on the ground that he had paid the admission of guilt
fine under coercion at the hands of police officers who attended
to him at the police station. On closer inspection, the notice
appeared to be fatally defective, as it did not disclose the offence
with which the accused was charged.
It is an essential prerequisite that any charge referred to in a
criminal summons, written notice to appear or information state-
ment must, on its face, be clear and sustainable to the extent that
were the accused have opted not to pay the admission of guilt
fine but proceed to trial he or she would have been able to plead
to that charge as it stood in the summons, notice or other formal
statement (para [11]).
SECTION 174 OF THE CRIMINAL PROCEDIURE ACT AND CLOSE AT END
OF PROSECUTION S CASE
The accused and his two co-accused in S v Masondo: In re S v
Mthembu and Others 2011 (2) SAC 286 (GSJ) stood arraigned on
a number of charges and applied for discharge at the close of the
State's case. It was emphasized that there is no obligation in
terms of section 174 of the Criminal Procedure Act for the court to
discharge the accused:
'The court is called upon to act judicially with sound judgment and in
the interest of justice. Ajudicial officer may be advised not to place too
much stress or emphasis on the say-so or decisions of other judges in
previous cases per se. The facts and circumstances of each case
should dictate what route to follow and the judge should be led to an
equitable, proper and/or just end result by the specific circumstances
and evidence inherent or led in the case as coloured and/or informed
by recognized rules, practices, laws and procedures' (para [37]).
In this matter, the forensic evidence and the evidence of the
pointing-out which had already been accepted against accused
2 were of such a nature that it called for a reply from accused 1.
See S v Nkosi and Another 2011 (2) SACR 482 (SCA) and S v
Lunga 2011 JDR 1072 (WCC).
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SEARCH AND SEIZURE NVARRANTS
The main question in Minister of Safety and Security v Van der
Merwe and Others 2011 (2) SACR 301 (CC) was whether search
and seizure warrants are valid despite their failure to mention the
offences to which the search relates.
The following common law principles of intelligibility were held to
require search warrants issued under section 21 of the Criminal
Procedure Act to specify the offences in respect of which they are
issued. A valid search warrant must in a reasonably intelligible
manner: state the statutory provision in terms of which it is used:
identify the searcher; clearly mention the authority it confers upon
the searcher; identify the person, container or premises to be
searched; describe the article to be searched for and seized, with
sufficient particularity and specify the offence which triggered the
criminal investigation and name of the suspected offender.
Additional guidelines observed by courts in considering the
validity of warrants include: the person issuing the warrant must
have authority and jurisdiction; the person authorizing the warrant
must satisfy him/herself that the affidavit contains sufficient
information on the existence of the jurisdictional facts the terms
of the warrant must be neither vague nor overbroad; the court
must always consider the validity of the warrants with a jealous
regard for the searched person's constitutional rights; and the
terms of the warrant must be construed with reasonable strict-
ness (paras [54]-[56]).
In Pakule v Minister of Safety and Security and Another, Tefeni v
Minister of Safety and Security and Another 2011 (2) SACR 358
(SCA), the two schools of thought on the application of sections
20 and 22 of the Criminal Procedure Act were considered. In
terms of the first school of thought, seized property must be
returned to the owner/possessor if the seizure was not based on
reasonable grounds. This also applies even though evidence
providing reasonable grounds to believe that the article had been
involved in the commission of an offence is discovered after the
seizure. With regard to motor vehicles for example, this approach
is said to apply even if it was subsequently found that the vehicle
had been tampered with. The second school of thought, however,
proposes that even though the seizure of the article/property was
not based on reasonable grounds, if it is subsequently well
grounded, the seizure is lawful and the police may retain the
article (para [2]).
The first approach is based on a restrictive interpretation of
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sections 20 and 22, given that they allow for limitations on
fundamental constitutional rights, the right to privacy, and the
right to property (para [7]). With regard to motor vehicles, for
example, it has been held that where evidence of tampering with
engine and chassis numbers is discovered, such evidence in
itself constitutes a reasonable ground for believing that a vehicle
had been stolen. Such tampering would ground a reasonable
belief that the vehicle was stolen and would justify a seizure
without warrant or the consent of the owner. It would also justify a
seizure where no reasonable belief initially existed that the article
had been involved in the commission of an offence (para [8]).
In Pakule and Tefeni, it was held that when a vehicle is in
possession of the police and they ascertain that there are indeed
such grounds for a reasonable belief that the item is concerned in
the commission of an offence - such as the tampering with
engine and chassis numbers - that they should seize the
vehicle. If this were not so and the vehicles were returned to their
owners/possessors, the police would be acting in contravention
of section 68 of the National Road Traffic Act 93 of 1996, which
provides that it is an offence to own or possess a vehicle with
which there had been tampered (para [26]).
SECTION 63(5) OF CHILD JUSTICF AcT 75 OF 2008 AND RIGHT TO
PUBLIC HEARING
An adult and minor accused stood arraigned on the murder of
Eugene Terre'blanche in the case of Media 24 Ltd and Others v
National Prosecuting Authority and Others (Media Monitoring
Africa as Amicus Curiae): In re S v Mahlangu and Another 2011
(2) SACR 321 (GNP). The applicants in this matter sought the
opportunity to have journalists employed by them to attend
the proceedings in order to report on the evidence and issues as
they emerge. They argued that the trial concerns issues of
profound public interest, that the holding of the trial completely
closed to the media will significantly limit the right to freedom to
receive information of members of the public and undermine the
principle of open justice, and that there is a simple mechanism
available to protect the best interest of a minor accused, while
preserving the right of members of the public to have knowledge
of the proceedings (para [7]).
However, section 63(5) of the Child Justice Act 75 of 2008
provides that proceedings in a trial of a minor accused are to be
held in the absence of any member of the public, including the
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media, unless the child justice court or the presiding officer has
granted permission to members of the public to be present. The
default position is therefore that the proceedings in a trial of a
minor accused be held in the absence of any member of the
public, unless special permission is granted (para [8]). The amicus
curiae, however, argued that while the right to freedom of expres-
sion and the vital function of the media fulfils an important role in
protecting the public's right to receive or impart information,
protecting the principle of open justice and enhancing the consti-
tutional values of openness, responsiveness and accountability,
these are not relevant considerations in a section 63(5) enquiry.
Rather, the protection of the child's best interest in all matters
concerning him/her as well as the child's rights to privacy, dignity
and a fair trial must be upheld. The presiding officer's discretion in
light of the various constitutional imperatives was furthermore
questioned, as well as whether the 'public interest' should be the
standard to which the section 63(5) applicants should be held
(para [10]).
The court agreed with the amicus curiae that the best-interest
principle coupled with the law's requirements that the child
accused's dignity, privacy and fair trial interest be protected
require that section 63(5) be understood to create a default
position whereby public attendance at child justice court pro-
ceedings are prohibited. However, it must also be accepted that
the legislature foresaw the possibility of exceptions. The first part
of the provision cannot, however, be interpreted so as to allow the
presiding officer from opening the child justice courtroom to a
class of persons, such as the media, or the public. And, a court's
discretion to grant attendance to such proceedings must be
exercised with reference to the values of the Constitution, includ-
ing the right to freedom of expression and the right to receive
information. A balance must therefore be struck between 'fair trial
interest' and 'public interest' (para [14]).
Emphasizing the fundamental nature of the rights of children
under the Constitution, and with specific reference to section
28(2), which provides that the best interest of a child shall be of
paramount importance in all matters concerning that child, the
court held that where a minor is the accused, permission for a trial
to be heard in open court should be granted on a case-by-case
basis, so that it does not militate against the proper consideration
of all the relevant circumstances (para [25]). This particular
matter attracted public interest due to the status of the deceased,
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the fact that the Hawks took over the investigation, that there was
a degree of racial tension around the time of the deceased's
death and suggestions that the AWB would attempt to avenge the
deceased's death. There were also speculations that the death
was linked to sexual activities and perceptions that the singing of
the song 'Kill the boer' was linked to the killing of the deceased
(para [24]). Permission was consequently granted for a restricted
number of media personnel to attend the proceedings (para
[27]).
PURPOSE FOR ARREST AND SECTION 40(1) (b) OF THE CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE ACT
In Erasmus v MEC for Transport, Eastern Cape 2011 (2) SACR
367 (ECM), the plaintiff sued for damages for her unlawful arrest
and detention after being arrested at a road block for driving a
motor vehicle without a driver's licence, or, alternatively, for failing
to carry her driver's licence in the vehicle which she was driving.
Despite the fact that an acquaintance brought the plaintiff's
driver's licence to the road block, she was still arrested and taken
to the police station where she signed and paid an admission of
guilt fine. The purpose of the arrest, according to the arresting
officer, was to 'educate' the plaintiff on the rules of the road. The
arresting officer also did not believe it unlawful to arrest a person
for the purpose of education (para [11]).
The treatment of the plaintiff in this matter was held to be
completely illegal and unjustified (para [24]).
ARRLS IN TLRM'S OF SECION 8 (4) OF TIE DOMLTIC VIOLENCE Ac I
The plaintiff in Greenberg v Gouws and Another 2011 (2) SACR
389 (GSJ) claimed damages pursuant to his alleged unlawful arrest
and detention. It transpired from the evidence that numerous
charges had been laid by the complainant against the plaintiff, and
he had also been arrested on a prior occasion for not complying
with a protection order that the complainant had obtained against
him. The plaintiff, however, had never been convicted on any of the
charges brought against him. The particular arrest and detention
that was the subject of this claim for damages was effected at the
police station by the defendant. The defendant had received a
number of complaints about the plaintiff and was investigating these
claims that the plaintiff allegedly contravened the protection order
when the defendant saw him at the police station and arrested him.
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Section 8(4)(b) of the Domestic Violence Act provides that a
member of the police may arrest a suspect, if there are reason-
able grounds to suspect that the complainant in a domestic
violence dispute may suffer imminent harm as a result of the
alleged breach of the protection order. When considering
whether there are reasonable grounds to suspect that a com-
plainant may suffer imminent harm, the police officer must take
into consideration the risk to the safety, health or wellbeing of the
complainant, as well as the seriousness of the conduct which
comprises an alleged breach of a protection order in terms of the
Act (para [27]).
As to what constitutes imminent harm, it was found that
imminent harm connotes harm that is about to happen (para
[30]). On the facts of this case it was clear that the police officer
(defendant) did not have reasonable grounds to suspect that the
complainant might suffer imminent harm as a result of the alleged
breach of the protection order. The arrest was consequently not
based upon any reasonable grounds (para [35]).
USE OF LETHAL FORCL IN EFFLCTING ARRLS
The four plaintiffs in Mondlane and Others v Minister of Safety
and Security 2011 (2) SACR 425 (GNP) claimed damages from
the defendant for unlawful arrest, detention and malicious pros-
ecution. The first and second plaintiffs also sued for damages
suffered by them as a result of injuries they sustained when a
police officer shot and wounded them. In this matter officers from
a security company responded to a call of a break-in at a music
shop. The emergency call also indicated that the four suspects
were driving in a Toyota Corolla at a high speed on the highway.
During an ensuing car chase the plaintiffs were shot and injured.
While the court held that the police had reasonable grounds
for believing that the plaintiffs were indeed involved with the
break-in at the music shop (the stolen music equipment was found
in the car) the primary question to be determined was whether the
police were justified in their use of force in effecting the arrest
(para [25]).
The use of force in effecting an arrest is justified only where the
arrestor believes on reasonable grounds that: he/the arrestor or
anybody lawfully assisting him with the arrest or any other person
needs protection from imminent or future death or grievous bodily
harm and the use of force is immediately necessary for that
purpose; that there is a substantial risk that the suspect will cause
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imminent or future death or grievous bodily harm if the arrest is
delayed: and that the offence for which the arrest is sought is in
progress and is of a forcible and serious nature and involves the
use of life threatening violence or a strong likelihood that it will
cause grievous bodily harm (para [32]). In terms of these
requirements, the police officer who had fired the shots did not
testify that, when he had fired the shots, he believed that there
was a substantial risk that the plaintiffs would cause imminent or
future death or grievous bodily harm if the arrest was delayed
(para [34]).
Moreover, section 49(2) of the Criminal Procedure Act includes
a separate requirement that the arrestor's belief must be based
on reasonable grounds. In this matter this requirement was not
considered as there was no evidence or testimony that the
arrestor who had fired the shots held the aforementioned belief
(para [35]). The use of force in this instance was accordingly held
to fall outside the ambit of section 49 of the Criminal Procedure
Act, and thus was unjustified and unlawful (para [36]).
In Kotze v Minister of Safety and Security 2011 JDR 1043
(GSJ), the plaintiff claimed damages from the defendants arising
out of the fact that he was shot by members of the South African
Police Service as the plaintiff and his wife tried to escape from the
armed robbers that were in the process of robbing their house.
The police and security personnel, however, testified that they
had shouted warnings at the speeding vehicle with which the
plaintiff and his wife were trying to escape and only fired shots
when the vehicle did not stop as ordered. They had also heard
shots fired inside the house and this alerted them to return fire.
Hartford AJ found, however, that the police had not fired any
warning shots and that the alleged shouting of warnings was
dubious as neither the plaintiff, his wife nor the police officers on
the other side of the house could hear such warnings being
shouted (para [132]). Without being sufficiently alerted in an
auditory manner of the presence of the police, either by way of
a warning shot, sirens or loud shouting, the plaintiff could not
be reasonably be expected to have known or believed that
the police had come to their rescue and were responsible for the
shots being fired (para [133]).
A proper interpretation of section 49(2) of the Criminal Proce-
dure Act furthermore requires that in addition to the requirement
that the suspect be sufficiently warned of the attempt to arrest
him or her, the suspect must also be afforded sufficient time to
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react to the clear attempt before force is utilized. In this instance
the warnings that were apparently shouted at the plaintiff pre-
ceded the firing of shots with seconds or happened simulta-
neously therewith (para [135]). It was found that the police in this
matter did not adhere to the requirements of section 49(2), they
did not make it clear to the suspects that an attempt to arrest
them was being made, and did not even have reasonable
grounds to believe that there was a substantial risk that the
plaintiff and his wife would cause imminent or future death or
grievous bodily harm to themselves (the police) or another, as
none of the police officers and security personnel were under
the impression that the shots that they had heard coming from the
house were aimed at them (para [141])
Firii JIURISDICTIONAi L REQUIREMENI FOR VALID ARRLST IN TmLRis OF
SECTION 40(1) OF CRIMINAL PROCEDIURF ACT
The two plaintiffs in Minister of Safety and Security v Sekhoto
and Another 2011 (5) SA 367 (SCA) were arrested by police
officers without warrants for arrest and on suspicion of contraven-
ing section 2 of the Stock Theft Act 57 of 1959. The plaintiffs were
detained for ten days before being released on bail. They were
later discharged at the end of the State's case and the plaintiff's
father was found guilty of stock theft.
The plaintiffs instituted a claim for damages alleging that they
were arrested unlawfully. Section 40(1)(b) and (g) of the Criminal
Procedure Act provides that a peace officer may arrest any
person without a warrant if the peace officer reasonably suspects
that person of having committed an offence referred to in
Schedule 1, or if that person is reasonably suspected of being or
having been in unlawful possession of stock or produce as
defined in any law relating to the theft of stock or produce.
The jurisdictional facts for a section 40(1)(b) defence include
that the arrestor must be a peace officer, the arrestor must
entertain a suspicion, the suspicion must be that the suspect (the
arrestee) committed an offence referred to in Schedule 1, and
the suspicion must be based on reasonable grounds (Duncan v
Minister of Law and Order 1986 (2) SA 805 (A) at 818G-H). Both
plaintiffs argued that they were arrested without any reasonable
grounds. The trial court found in favour of the plaintiffs in the
absence of evidence of another jurisdictional fact laid down in
Louw v Minister of Safety and Security 2006 (2) SACR 178 (T)
at 186-7. In the latter case, Bertelsmann J articulated a fifth
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jurisdictional fact: police are obliged to consider in each case
whether there are no less invasive options to bring the suspect
before the court than an immediate detention of the person
concerned. 'If there is no reasonable apprehension that the
suspect will abscond or fail to appear in court if a warrant is first
obtained for his or her arrest, or a notice or summons to appear in
court is obtained, then it is constitutionally untenable to exercise
the power to arrest' (Louw para [10]). The Minister had appealed
to the Free State High Court against this inclusion of a fifth
jurisdictional fact but the High Court confirmed the trial court's
judgment in this regard.
In Sekhoto, the Supreme Court of Appeal considered the prin-
ciples governing interpretation of the Constitution and the applica-
tion of the Bill of Rights in order to develop the common law (paras
[14]-[18]). The court emphasized that once the jurisdictional facts
for arrest are present, a discretion arises for the peace officer to
effect the arrest without a warrant, or to refrain from arresting the
suspect. The decision that the peace officer makes in this regard
must be based on an intention to bring the arrested person to justice
(para [30]). Since the Act is silent on the exact manner and process
in which the discretion must be exercised, this can be deduced by
inference in accordance with the ordinary rules of construction,
consonant with the Constitution (para [42]). However, this discretion
(and the manner in which it is exercised) does not form part of the
jurisdictional facts that must be met for an arrest in terms of section
40(1)(b) of the Criminal Procedure Act. The court held that if the
proper exercise of the discretion is included as a jurisdictional fact
for arrest it follows ineluctably that the arrestor has to bear the onus
of alleging and proving that the discretion was properly exercised.
The Supreme Court of Appeal concluded that the court in Louwhad
conflated jurisdictional facts with the exercise of a discretion in
terms of section 40(1)(b) of the Criminal Procedure Act (para [45]).
In another matter dealing with a valid arrest in terms of section
40(1) of the Criminal Procedure Act, Beukes v The Minister of
Safety and Security 2011 JRD 0735 (GNP), it was held that the
determination of the reasonableness of the suspicion requires a
critical assessment and evaluation of all relevant information
available to the arresting officer at the time of the arrest (para [12]).
See also Borain v Minister of Safety and Security 2011 JDR 1621
(KZD), Forbes v Minister of Safety and Security 2011 JDR 0733




SEIZURE IN TERMS OF SECTION 13(8) OF SOUTH AFRICAN POLICF
SERVICLS Act 68 oF 1995
The applicant's motor vehicle was seized at a road block by
members of the South African Police Service in Guga v Minister of
Safety and Security and Others [2011] 1 All SA 413 (ECM). The
purpose of the road block was to check for stolen vehicles by
examining engine and chassis numbers, and the respondents
seized the applicant's vehicle based on the discrepancies found
on the engine and chassis numbers.
Whenever a search and seizure operation is conducted in
terms of a warrant issued under section 21(1)(a) of the Criminal
Procedure Act, or section 13(8) of the South African Police
Service Act 68 of 1995, it must comply with the provisions of
section 20 of the Criminal Procedure Act in order to be lawful
(para [13]). Section 20 provides police with general powers to
seize an item which is concerned in or on reasonable grounds
believed to be concerned in the commission or suspected
commission of an offence, or which may afford evidence of the
commission of an offence. Section 13(8) of the South African
Police Service Act regulates the setting up of police road blocks
and the procedure to be followed at a road block.
The element of reasonable suspicion in section 20 of the Criminal
Procedure Act accordingly also applies to the seizure of items at
road blocks, and the test to determine the existence of such
reasonable grounds is objective (para [19]). The element of reason-
able suspicion must also be present when justifying the authoriza-
tion certificate for the setting up of a road block in terms of section
13(8)(a) of the South African Police Service Act.
In this matter the respondents could not show that the appli-
cant's motor vehicle was an item to be seized under section
13(8), as they had failed to satisfy the jurisdictional element of
reasonable suspicion as contained in section 20 of the Criminal
Procedure Act.
See also Ngqukumba v Minister of Safety and Security 2011
JDR 1390 (ECM).
RIGHt To REMAIN SILLNT AND SECTION 112(2) OF THL CRIMINAL
PROCEDURL ACT
The appellant in Tshabalala vS 2011 (1) SACR 497 (GNP) was
charged and convicted on two counts of fraud and two counts of
forgery. His legal representative withdrew shortly before the
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charges were put to the appellant. However, before withdrawing,
the legal representative indicated that he had thoroughly dis-
cussed the case with the appellant and that the appellant
intended to plead guilty. The appellant subsequently decided to
continue without legal representation and pleaded guilty on all
counts. The appellant subsequently appealed against both the
convictions and sentences, arguing that the magistrate erred in
not warning him that he had a right to remain silent when the
provisions of section 112(2) of the Criminal Procedure Act were
explained to him.
The rationale behind section 112(2) is to determine whether an
accused truly admits to all of the elements of the charges against
him/her and to determine whether there is a possible defence for
the accused's actions. It has been said that to warn the accused
of his right to remain silent shortly before the section 112(2)
questioning actually conflicts with the spirit of the section and
possibly obstructs the accused from giving information that may
be to his advantage to divulge (para [6]; S v Mabaso and Another
1990 (3) SA 185 (A) at 201 C-E; S v Nkosi and Another 1984 (3)
SA 345 (A) at 353D-E). However, divergent views exist on
whether an accused must be warned about his/her right to
remain silent before answering questions in terms of section
112(2) of the Criminal Procedure Act (see S v Maseko 1996 (2)
SACR 91 (W) S v Damons and Others 1997 (2) SACR 218 (W)
at 224E-F and 224B; Director of Public Prosecutions Natal v
Magidela and Another 2000 (1) SA 458 (SCA) at 465-6).
Mavundla J held that to decide whether there is an obligation to
inform the accused of his right to remain silent when being
questioned in terms of section 112(2) of the Criminal Procedure
Act must be answered in the context of the right to remain silent,
and in terms of section 39(2) of the Constitution, which provides
that when interpreting legislation and/or developing the common
law, every court must promote the spirit, purport and object of
the Bill of Rights (para [11]). It was submitted that an accused
person cannot selectively be informed of his or her right to remain
silent (para [17]). Especially where an accused is unrepresented,
he or she must be informed of the right to remain silent at all
relevant stages of the criminal proceedings. Section 35(3)(j) of
the Constitution ensures that self-incriminating evidence cannot
be solicited from an accused person directly or indirectly. It is
accordingly necessary for the accused also to be informed of the
right to remain silent before he or she pleads guilty and answers
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questions in terms of section 112(2) of the Criminal Procedure Act
(para [19]).
Where an accused has not been informed of this right before
the section 112(2) questioning, a procedural irregularity has
taken place. And whether this irregularity will vitiate the trial must
be decided on a case-by-case basis (para [20]). (Here it was
decided that the appellant was not prejudiced by the fact that the
magistrate did not inform him of his right to remain silent before
the questioning in terms of section 112(2) of the Criminal Proce-
dure Act.)
PERMANENT STAY OF PROSECUTION
The applicant in Brown v The National Director of Public
Prosecutions 2011 JDR 1269 (WCC) was arrested on different
occasions from March 2007 to 31 January 2011 and charged
with, inter alia, theft and fraud. There was also a warrant for his
wife's arrest, but she had left the country together with their two
minor children without informing the DSO. After each arrest the
applicant was released on bail and on 10 December 2008,
the applicant launched an application for a permanent stay of
prosecution. He withdrew this application on 10 November 2009
but again applied for a permanent stay in the proceedings which
was launched on 31 January 2011. The applicant applied for the
immediate and permanent stay of the prosecution on the follow-
ing basis: the misconduct and partiality of the prosecutor and the
investigating officers of the DSO in respect of the criminal
charges against him, the unlawful conduct of certain prosecutors
of the former DSO and investigating team to appoint an attorney
of their choice to represent him in respect of plea bargain
negotiations whilst he was medically unfit and incarcerated at
Pollsmoor during 2008, and the wide and adverse media cover-
age against him in respect of the Fidentia Group allegations and
charges, which has resulted in the general public, some judicial
officers and lawyers viewing him as a fraudster and thief having
stolen billions from widows and orphans (para [18]).
It is generally accepted that a permanent stay of prosecution is
a drastic remedy and either party may apply to a court for such a
stay of proceedings which may be on a temporary or permanent
basis (para [22]). It is furthermore a matter that lies completely
within a court's discretion as there are no guidelines to be
followed, but each case will be decided on its own merits. This
discretion of courts to grant a stay of prosecution ought to be
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exercised sparingly and only in exceptional circumstances (para
[23]). The party applying for such a stay in the proceedings must
prove that their right to a fair trial had been infringed upon and
that this remedy is the only viable option. The likelihood of being
prejudiced by external factors is not sufficient; the party must
prove that there is irreparable trial related prejudice, and that
the extraordinary circumstances justify this radical remedy. If the
prejudice suffered is not trial related, then other (less drastic)
remedies must be considered (paras [24]-[25]).
In this instance the applicant's application was based on the
fact that the respondents had shown vindictiveness, prejudice
and animosity towards him, and that he had committed no
criminal act, but that the respondents were fabricating the
allegations against him (para [35]). The respondents denied
these allegations in its entirety and held that by virtue of the
profile of the matter and the magnitude of the charges, it was
inevitable that the media would report widely on the matter (para
[53]). While the court dismissed the applicants contention that
the prosecution was vindictive and partial, the court did agree
that there was indeed adverse media coverage in the applicant's
case. It was said that objectively speaking, the perception was
created in the media that there had already been a pronounce-
ment on the allegations against the applicant. Yet, for a perma-
nent stay of prosecution the applicant had to prove that the
adverse media coverage gave rise to trial related prejudice, and
that it would lead to an unfair trial. The applicant also had to prove
that there were extraordinary circumstances that were applicable
to his case (para [93]).
The rights that have to be balanced in a matter like this are
the right to open justice, the right to freedom of expression and
the right to a fair trial (para [98]). It must furthermore be noted that
presiding officers (in terms of the South African legal system) are
impartial when sitting in their official capacity. A judge is a person
of high integrity and honesty and judges take an oath when they
are appointed to uphold the law and to administer justice in an
appropriate manner (para [105]). Judges furthermore have years
of experience and are aware of the dangers of media reports in
'high profile' cases. A judge will therefore review each case
based on its own merits (para [115]).
While the media coverage had been adverse in this case, the
court held that the applicant did not succeed in showing a link
between the adverse media coverage and the effect that it would
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have on the evidence that would be presented during the trial
and how it would result in the applicant not having a fair trial (para
[119]). Since the applicant could also not prove that the prosecu-
tors and investigators were guilty of misconduct, impartiality and
unlawful conduct, the application for a permanent stay of pros-
ecution was not granted.
ADJOURNMENT OF PROCEEDINGS IN TERMIS OF SECTION 168 OF
CRIMIN AL PROCLDURE ACT
The trial magistrate in Director of Public Prosecutions KwaZulu-
Natal v Regional Magistrate TW Levitt 2011 JDR 0352 (KZP)
refused an application by the applicant to adjourn the matter
(case no 23/16447/2008) and as a consequence forced the
applicant to close its case. An application for the discharge of
the accused in that case was consequently granted. The appli-
cant now sought an order reviewing and setting aside the initial
order made by the respondent to not allow a further adjournment.
In terms of section 168 of the Criminal Procedure Act, a
magistrate has the power to adjourn proceedings, if the court
deems it necessary or expedient to do so. It is a decision
completely under the discretion of the magistrate and may not be
interfered with except on the ground that the magistrate had not
exercised a judicial discretion. The decision must depend upon
the material facts of the particular case and an appeal court may
furthermore not substitute its discretion for that of the magistrate
merely on the ground that it would have come to a different
conclusion (paras [5]-[6]).
In this matter the prosecutor had asked for an adjournment
once before because his witnesses were not available, and on
the return date yet another witness was not available, and since
he had not subpoenaed the witness he again asked for an
adjournment. He initially indicated to the magistrate that he only
had one further witness to call, but later, after taking the magis-
trate's decision on review, the prosecutor indicated that he had
more than one witness that he still wanted to call in support of
his case. Another factor that had to be considered in this case
was that if the matter had been adjourned, the earliest possible
date would have been at least six months later (para [10]). The
prosecutor later admitted that it was due to his neglect that
the necessary witnesses were not in attendance. This was a
serious neglect, since the State had at least four months to
secure the attendance of their witnesses (para [11]).
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Swain J held that the magistrate in this case had not failed to
exercise the discretion judicially. All of the evidence led against
the accused up to that stage of the proceeding was considered,
and the nature and materiality of the evidence which the State
wished to lead was also considered together with the history of
the matter, the need for the previous adjournment and the
possible prejudice against the accused if the matter was to be
adjourned again (paras [12]-[13]). The applicant's application for
the review and setting aside of the order made by the trial
magistrate was therefore unsuccessful.
DUTY To BRING ARRESTED PERSONS BEFORE CO1URT TIIIIN 48
HouRs OF ARRLS
The plaintiffs in Hash v The Honourable Minister of Safety and
Security2011 JDR 0930 (ECP) claimed damages for their alleged
wrongful and unlawful arrest and detention and for malicious
prosecution. The plaintiffs were arrested on 1 July 2007 (a
Sunday evening) without a warrant and detained on a charge of
robbery with aggravating circumstances. They appeared before
a magistrate on 4 July (they appeared on a Wednesday morning
and the 48 hour detention period actually expired on the Tuesday
evening) and the matter was remanded to 11 July 2007. The
magistrate ordered that the plaintiffs be held in custody. On
11 July 2007, the plaintiffs were released on bail and the matter
was further remanded to 24 August 2007, on which date all
charges against the plaintiffs were withdrawn.
Section 50(1)(c) of the Criminal Procedure Act provides that an
accused be brought before a court as soon as reasonably
possible and not later than 48 hours after arrest. This provision is
subject to section 50(1)(d), which provides that if the 48 hours
expire outside ordinary court hours, or on a day which is not an
ordinary court day, the accused must be brought before a court
not later than the end of the first court day.
In Prinsloo v Nasionale Vervolgingsgesag en Andere 2011 (2)
SA 214 (GNP), section 50(1)(d) was interpreted to mean that if the
48 hours within which the accused person must have been
brought before a court expire outside normal court hours, or on a
day which is not a normal court day, then the accused must be
brought before a court during and not later than the end of the
first court day after his arrest. On an acceptance of this interpre-
tation, the plaintiffs in this matter had to be brought before a court
on the first day of their arrest - Monday 2 July (para [70]).
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However, Eksteen J did not agree with this interpretation
and reasoned that it would give rise to absurd results which
the legislature could not have envisaged. Section 50(1)(d) of the
Criminal Procedure Act is clear: a detained person must be
brought before a court as soon as reasonably possible, but not
later than 48 hours, after the arrest. And, what is reasonable
would depend on all the circumstances of each case (para [71]).
In this case the plaintiffs were held to have appeared on the first
court day after the lapse of 48 hours as is required by section 50
(para [72]).
RIGHT To LEGAL REPRFSENTATION XND SECTION 26(6) OF THE
PREVLNTION OF ORG ANIZED CRIME ACT 121 OF 1998
The legal question in Naidoo v National Director of Public
Prosecutions 2011 JDR 0937 (CC) was whether a court that
issued an order restraining an accused from dealing with his/her
assets in terms of the Prevention of Organized Crime Act 121 of
1998 (POCA), may allow for such an accused's legal expenses to
be incurred from assets held by a person other than that
accused.
The relevant provision of the POCA, section 26(6), provides
that a restraint order may make provision for the reasonable living
expenses of a person against whom the restraining order is made
as well as that of his or her family or household, and for the
reasonable legal expenses of such person in connection with any
proceedings instituted against him or her in terms of any criminal
proceedings to which such proceedings may relate.
The applicant in this case was charged with 119 counts of
dealing in unwrought metals, and the first respondent had
obtained a restraint order against the accused and his former
spouse with whom the accused still shared a house. The order
against the accused's estranged spouse related to specified
assets which constituted an affected gift to her by the accused
and in terms of section 12(1) of the POCA. These assets included
two companies of which the accused's wife was the sole director
and shareholder.
In the High Court, it was held that the property held by the
accused's former wife in fact belonged to the accused. This was
considered a logical conclusion of the restraint order the purpose
of which was to restrain the property of the accused. The
properties' legal status was therefore regarded as belonging to
the accused, and it could be utilized in paying for the accused's
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legal expenses (para [7]). The Supreme Court of Appeal inter-
preted section 26(6)(a) of the POCA to mean that a restraint order
may make provision for the legal expenses of only a person
against whom that restraint order is being made. It was conse-
quently held that the assets which the accused's former wife
controls could not make provision for the legal expenses of the
accused, as he was not the person against whom that specific
restraint order was made (para [9]).
The applicant argued that he had the right to employ legal
representatives of his choice, and that section 26(6)(b) of the
POCA should be interpreted broadly so as to give effect to his
right to a fair trial (para [11]). It was also argued that the property
restrained as an 'affected gift' should be regarded as the
property of the person who had made that gift since, under
the common law, if the object of an underlying contract is illegal
or unlawful, the transfer of the ownership is void (para [12]). And
in the alternative, it was argued that if the restrained property was
in fact property held by the accused's ex-wife and her two
companies, the provisions could still yield an interpretation that
favoured the accused, as the phrase 'against whom the restraint
order is made' does not appear in section 26(6)(b) (para [13]).
The respondents submitted that the accused's ex-wife had not
been charged with any criminal offences, and she had also
not made any disclosures of assets in terms of section 26(6). To
allow, therefore, that provision be made for the accused's legal
cost from property held by her would create the possibility of
abuse by accused persons seeking a subsidy for their legal
expenses from restrained assets held by others and may frustrate
the very purpose of restraint proceedings, which is to prevent
offenders from reaping the benefits of their crimes (para [15]).
In the case before the Constitutional Court it was found that
section 26(6) does create a mechanism through which an
unconvicted accused can access restrained assets held by him
or her for reasonable legal expenses, as well as living and
household expenses. The primary purpose of this provision is
accordingly not to punish an unconvicted accused but to strip
from offenders the benefits of their crimes (para [18]). Yet, the
express terms of section 26(6) make allowance for reasonable
living and legal expenses only on limited terms. The access is
granted only for the legal expenses of a person against whom the
restraint order was made and it is conditional on full disclosure.
The person must also not be able to meet the said expenses out
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of his or her unrestrained property (para [20]). The provisions of
the POCA (ss 26(1), 12 and 14) accordingly permit restraint
orders to be made only against realizable property held by the
person against whom the order is made and not against realiz-
able property held by another person (para [23]). It was con-
cluded that
'[t]o interpret the wide discretion conferred by s 26(1) as permitting an
override of the preconditions expressly set in s 26(6) would run
counter to the scheme of the provisions as a whole. The provision for
reasonable legal and living expenses in s 26(6) is narrowly and finely
crafted. ... And its overall legislative purpose must be borne in mind.
It is to discourage defendants who face criminal prosecution from
hiding their assets. If a defendant retains the alleged proceeds of
crime, they remain available for living and legal expenses. But if these
assets are donated away, they become unavailable for this purpose'
(para [30]),
